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REFERRING TO A FRAME?
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTRACT 
LAW PROJECT
Jan-Peter Trnka* 
Summary: In 2005 the Joint Network on European Private Law was en-
trusted by the European Commission with drafting a Common Frame 
of Reference (CFR) for European contract law. In the Commission’s 
own words, the CFR is to be ‘a tool box for the Commission when 
preparing proposals, both for the existing acquis and for new instru-
ments’. The Commission could not have emphasised more often that 
the CFR is not to become a new European Civil Code. Nevertheless, 
and perhaps paradoxically, the expected outcome of the Network’s 
efforts is indeed a model law, ie a code, which is to be presented by 
the end of 2007. 
This article focuses on two aspects of the overall harmonisation proj-
ect. First, the constitutional setting for harmonising private law is 
highlighted. Are there limits to the internal market mandate? It would 
seem that the post-Maastricht challenge of setting such limits has not 
yet been resolved. The EC Treaty’s post-Tobacco Advertising Article 
95 does not provide unlimited competence to adopt a comprehensive 
European contract law. However, the lack of concrete criteria leaves 
much room for activity by the EC legislator. The article describes the 
criteria stipulated by the European Court of Justice, and also criti-
cally discusses the use of empirical data in this respect. In the second 
part, the meaning of the frame of reference and the fi rst statements on 
the work in progress are examined. The new instrument will assume 
a concrete form very soon, and the paradox of drafting a CFR code 
while making ‘no-code’ claims demands attention. The Commission 
has defi ned what the Network should elaborate for the CFR as ‘best 
solutions’. The article outlines the scope of the CFR and discusses the 
necessity of such an instrument, as well as the idea of fi nding ‘best 
solutions’. In this respect, the idea of a regulatory competition scheme 
for European contract law is supported. Differences between national 
legal systems are the essential precondition for a learning process 
within the Community. At the same time, detecting inconsistencies 
within the existing acquis is a reasonable concern. One possible role 
of the CFR is to serve as a quality control instrument when drafting 
European legislation. 
* Jan-Peter Trnka, University of Helsinki.
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I. Introduction
With the start of the millennium, a major European contract law 
project was launched. Backed by the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, the Commission has encouraged and supported numerous aca-
demic projects, getting stakeholders from various branches of the legal 
community and government experts into the game.1 In its three commu-
nications on European contract law, released in 2001, 2003 and 2004, 
the Commission inquired as to what the real needs in this fi eld were. 
In response, there was more than one voice in the more enthusiastic 
early days of the project calling for a ‘European Civil Code’.2 However, 
the stakes have changed: today we are striving for a Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR), and the Commission could not have emphasised more 
often that the CFR is not to become a new European Civil Code. Rather, it 
should provide ‘a tool box for the Commission when preparing proposals, 
both for the existing acquis and for new instruments’.3 Nevertheless, and 
perhaps paradoxically, the expected outcome of the research network’s 
efforts is indeed a model law, ie a code, which is to be presented by the 
end of 2007.4
However, the CFR is not the only possible outcome of the contract 
law project, whose envisaged objectives also include increased coherence 
and quality for the acquis and the elaboration of both EU-wide stand-
ard terms and conditions and an ‘optional instrument’.5 Given the sheer 
breadth and complexity of the overall project, it would be impossible to 
try and comment on every single objective. This article’s focus is, there-
fore, limited to discussion of the CFR. Nevertheless, two fundamental 
issues connected to the idea of harmonisation will be illuminated in this 
context. Following a short introduction to the project in general, the ques-
tion of competences and the interplay of the supranational and Member 
State spheres is highlighted, while the project’s search for ‘best solutions’ 
1  For a summary of the latest developments, see H Beale, ‘The European Commission’s 
Common Frame of Reference Project: A progress report’ (2006) ERCL 303.
2  Representatively, O Lando, ‘Does the European Union need a Civil Code?’ (2003) Recht 
der Internationalen Wirtschaft 1. Lando advocates an even wider view of a Global Commer-
cial Code in (2004) Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 161.
3  Commission (EC), ‘European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: The way for-
ward’ (Communication) COM (2004) 651 fi nal, 11 October 2004, Annex I (Possible structure 
of the CFR).
4  Christian von Bar, chairman of the Study Group on a European Civil Code, confi rmed 
this at a hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs on 21 November 
2006: ‘Wir werden den Verfassungsorganen der EU und der Öffentlichkeit in wenig mehr 
als einem Jahr einen Text vorlegen, der sich der Darstellungsform - ich betone: der Darstel-
lungsform - eines kommentierten und annotierten Modellgesetzes bedient. Aber natürlich 
ist das kein Europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch. Es ist lediglich ein Stilmittel ….’.
5  See 2004 Communication (n 3).
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is discussed critically. It would seem that the post-Maastricht challenge 
of establishing limits to the internal market competence has not yet been 
resolved. Despite the need for action concerning contract law on various 
law-building sites and welcome contributions to the political project from 
academia, the overall effort to further invade the Member State sphere on 
such grounds seems undesirable.
II. The evolution of European contract law
First steps towards common contract law rules
When the European Economic Community was founded in 1957, the 
architects of the common market were primarily concerned with open-
ing cross-border trade and increasing economic growth. All this began 
to change at the end of the 1970s, when the Member States recognised 
the need to develop a more comprehensive social policy at the European 
level. At this time, the Member States expressed their desire for Euro-
pean Community institutions to become involved in questions like public 
health and consumer protection. In the fi eld of contract law, this recogni-
tion has led primarily to the gradual emergence of European consumer 
protection law.6 Sector-specifi c measures have included legislation on 
issues such as liability for defective products, doorstep selling, or con-
sumer credit arrangements.7
But social policies and globalisation trends not only triggered ac-
tivity by European legislators on the national and supranational levels; 
they also fostered numerous international and private academic efforts to 
establish uniform rules for contractual relations. As such, the Rome Con-
vention on law applicable to contractual obligations, the UN Convention 
on the international sale of goods (CISG), and the UNIDROIT principles of 
international commercial contracts represent milestones on the way to-
wards common contract law rules.8 Also, many academic working groups 
have become well established on the legislative scene since the 1980s.9 
6  Concerning the origins and evolution of consumer law, see G Howells and T Wilhelmsson, 
EC Consumer Law (Ashgate/Dartmouth,  Aldershot and Brookfi eld 1997). 
7  Council Directive (EEC) 85/374 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products 
[1985] OJ L210/29; Council Directive (EEC) 85/577 to protect the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises [1985] OJ L372/31; Council Directive 
(EEC) 87/102 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States concerning consumer credit [1986] OJ L42/48.
8  An excellent collection of important texts on European private law, comprising the UN 
Sales Convention and the UNIDROIT principles, is O Radley-Gardner, H Beale, R Zimmer-
mann and R Schulze, Fundamental Texts on European Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland 2003).
9  For a more comprehensive account, see eg B Lurger, Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung 
des Vertragsrechts in der Europäischen Union (Springer, Wien/New York 2002) 11-21.
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It is no surprise, therefore, that leading members of the Commission on 
European Contract Law, led by Ole Lando; the Study Group on a Euro-
pean Civil Code, chaired by Christian von Bar; the Acquis Group, led by 
Hans Schulte-Nölke and Gianmaria Ajani; and the Common Core Group, 
centred around Ugo Mattei and Mauro Bussani, are today involved in the 
Joint Network on European Private Law (the CoPECL network), which is 
drafting the CFR.10 
This revival of legislative activity at the European level accompanied 
the Single European Act of 1986, with its project of completing the forma-
tion of the internal market by the end of 1992. Among other measures, 
the current Articles 14 and 95 EC were introduced when the Treaty was 
revised. With the establishment of a single market, the European Com-
munity has begun to make an impact on commercial and consumer law 
in particular, and a multitude of directives have begun covering core are-
as of contract law. Community legislation based on the new Article 95 EC 
(formerly Article 100a EC) has started to govern such signifi cant areas 
of contractual relations as the defi nition of unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, distance-selling arrangements, the sale of consumer goods, 
or e-commerce.11 Taking the comprehensive jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) into account, scholars are beginning to speak of 
‘European contract law in a factual sense’ within the acquis communau-
taire.12
However, the internal market project is still under way in Europe, 
even fi fteen years after the target date for its establishment in 1992. The 
Community legislator’s sector-specifi c approach has not yet created an 
equal playing fi eld for the various actors, while international conventions 
and commercial practices further complicate the search for coherence. 
The provisions of European secondary law have been characterised as 
10  To name but a few of the most important research groups on the development of a com-
mon European contract law. For further information, see the offi cial website of the Joint 
Network on European Private Law (CoPECL = Common Principles of European Contract 
Law) <http://www.copecl.org> accessed 30 May 2007.
11  Council Directive (EEC) 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L95/29; 
Council Directive (EC) 97/7 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance con-
tracts [1997] OJ L144/19; Council Directive (EC) 1999/44 on certain aspects of the sale 
of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L171/12; Council Directive (EC) 
2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [2000] OJ L178/1.
12  U Magnus, ‘Europäisches Vertragsrecht und materielles Einheitsrecht - künftige Sym-
biose oder störende Konkurrenz?’ in H Mansel, T Pfeiffer, H Kronke, C Kohler, R Hausmann 
(eds) Festschrift für Erik Jayme (Sellier, München 2004) 1307. The quantum of secondary 
legislation has fi nally led to the emergence of a separate legal discipline, ie European pri-
vate law (Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht). Many textbooks have already been published in new 
and revised editions, eg B Heiderhoff, Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (2nd edn Sellier, München 
2007).
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‘islands in a broad sea of Member State law’.13 Thus many scholars argue 
that the diversity of national contract regimes remains an obstacle to 
intra-European cross-border trade, and that stronger action is needed.14 
Nevertheless, national legal orders represent functioning legal systems, 
and so many other scholars have called for careful consideration before 
rushing into harmonisation projects.15 
Genesis of the European contract law project
The idea of European contract law appeared on the European po-
litical agenda as a new initiative against fragmentation. The European 
Parliament had already called for a European code of private law in two 
Resolutions from 1989 and 1994.16 However, the contract law project in 
its present form may be said to have been launched only with the ‘Tam-
pere milestones’, ie the conclusions of the European Council in Tampere 
in 1999, including a commitment to establish ‘a genuine European area 
of justice’ and, in particular, ‘greater convergence in civil law’.17 
In 2001 the Commission fi nally got active and adopted its Commu-
nication on European contract law, aimed at gathering information on 
whether there was a need for EU action in this area.18 Not only did the 
Commission enter the arena after being silent for so long; it also surpris-
ingly challenged its own sector-specifi c, vertical approach to harmoni-
sation, opening the debate on more far-reaching action: ‘The European 
Commission is interested at this stage in gathering information on the 
need for farther-reaching EC action in the area of contract law, in par-
ticular to the extent that the case-by-case approach might not be able 
to solve all the problems which might arise’.19 In this regard, the options 
for future EC activity explicitly named were not limited to review and im-
provement of the acquis, but also included the development of common 
contract law principles and the adoption of comprehensive legislation.20 
13  R Schulze, ‘European Private Law and Existing EC Law’ (2005) European Review of 
Private Law 3.
14  Representatively, U Drobnig, ‘A Subsidiary Plea: A European Contract Law for Intra-
European Border-Crossing Contracts’ in S Grundmann and J Stuyck (eds), An Academic 
Green Paper on European Contract Law (Kluwer, The Hague 2002) 343.
15  One representative voice is the recently established Study Group on Social Justice in 
European Private Law. See their manifesto in ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: A 
manifesto’ (2004) European Law Journal 653.
16  EC OJ 1989 C158/400 and EC OJ 1994 C205/518.
17  Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions.
18  Commission (EC), ‘On European contract law’ (Communication) COM (2001) 398 fi nal, 
11 July 2001.
19  Ibid, Executive Summary.
20  Ibid, point 4. Option I: No EC action; Option II: Development of common contract law 
principles leading to more convergence of national laws; Option III: Improve the quality of 
legislation already in place; Option IV: Adopt new comprehensive legislation at EC level.
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Responses to the Communication pointed to manifold obstacles that 
would result from the diversity of national contract law. The problem ar-
eas identifi ed included the following in particular:
• inconsistencies in specifi c cases where several EC acts may be ap-
plicable, with confl icting results;
• undefi ned or too broadly defi ned abstract legal terms in directives, 
such as, for example, ‘contract’, ‘damage’ or ‘equitable remunera-
tion’;
• the principle of minimum harmonisation, which was criticised for 
not achieving uniform solutions; and
• the failure of some directives to solve problems in practice.21
The Commission was quick to reply, drafting an Action Plan at the 
beginning of 2003, in which it set out its conclusions in light of these re-
sponses, and launching a second round of discussion.22 The Commission 
took the opportunity to set aside the option of non-intervention by the EC 
legislator and simply relying on the competition of legal orders.23 Instead, 
it emphasised the need to promote work on three initiatives. Besides the 
development of EU-wide standard contract terms, the Commission also 
named the CFR and an ‘optional instrument’, a 28th legal order which 
could be chosen by the parties, as objectives of the project.24 The follow-
up Communication, entitled ‘European Contract Law and the revision of 
the acquis: The way forward’ and released in late 2004, already featured 
concrete guidelines for work on the CFR.25 
It is important to note that the European contract law project kept 
moving even following the rejection of the European Constitution by 
France and the Netherlands, and despite the overall perception that inte-
gration initiatives in Europe would cease. At the beginning of May 2005, 
the European Commission approved funding for a network of academics, 
21  See, in particular, the Commission’s summary in Commission (EC), ‘A more coherent con-
tract - An action plan’ (Communication) COM (2003) 68 fi nal, 12 February 2001, point 3.
22  Ibid.
23  In this respect, see the critical discussion of contradictions and possible political mo-
tives and intentions on the Commission’s part by M Kenny, ‘The 2004 Communication on 
European Contract Law: Those magnifi cent men in their unifying machines’ (2005) EL Rev 
724, 728-729. 
24  For the purpose of this article, the scope of discussion is limited mainly to the CFR. Thus 
the large debate on the Standard Contract Terms and the optional instrument, an opt-in 
versus an opt-out model, and other connected problems is not further discussed. On the 
latter, see eg J Basedow, ‘Ein optimales Europäisches Vertragsgesetz - opt-in, opt-out, wozu 
überhaupt?’ (2004) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1. For a general overview of EC 
activitities, see M Röttinger, ‘Towards a European Code Napoléon/AGBG/BGB? Recent EC 
Activities for a European Contract Law (2006) European Law Journal 807. 
25  2004 Communication (n 3).
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practitioners and government experts charged with drafting the CFR.26 At 
the end of November of that year, the Competitiveness Council expressed 
its full support for all the activities initiated by the Commission, as did 
the European Parliament shortly afterwards.27
However, even as it established a major contract law project, the 
Commission also cautiously signalled certain reservations regarding 
its scope. During consultations the Commission has discreetly backed 
off from its earlier broad approach to legislative activity, refocusing the 
project on improving the existing acquis and assisting the preparation of 
any future acquis. The original idea of a comprehensive code for Europe 
was abandoned relatively soon, due to a lack of support at the political 
and academic level.28 Even the idea of an ‘optional instrument’ seems to 
be disappearing from the agenda. The 2003 Action Plan and the follow-
up 2004 Communication still listed this ‘optional instrument’ among the 
measures to be elaborated, and at least invited further discussion on the 
‘opportuneness of this instrument’.29 The brief comments on such oppor-
tuneness in the Commission’s fi rst annual progress report in 2005, how-
ever, do not demonstrate much enthusiasm for a model law of broader 
scope.30 A narrower approach is also apparent from various statements 
made by Commission offi cials and a change in focus of the workshops 
held by groups involved in discussing the CFR’s scope.31 Indeed, work-
shops on wider aspects of contract law were cancelled in 2006, while 
those that were held concentrated on consumer law and, therefore, the 
existing acquis.32
26  Cf C von Bar and H Schulte-Nölke, ‘Gemeinsamer Referenzrahmen für europäisches 
Schuld- und Sachenrecht’ (2005) Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 165.
27  See Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council, 28-29 November 2005; European Par-
liament resolution on European contract law and the revision of the acquis: The way for-
ward, 23 March 2006; European Parliament resolution on European contract law, 4 Sep-
tember 2006.
28  This was especially due to the stakeholders and institutional actors, particularly the 
European Parliament, who expressed unwillingness to support these ideas without having 
a signifi cant say in the decisions. Note the explicit wording of the 2004 Communication (n 
3): ‘[I]t is important to explain that it is [not] the Commission’s intention to propose a “Eu-
ropean civil code” which would harmonise contract laws of Member States’ (point 2.3).
29  See 2004 Communication (n 3) point 2.3 and Annex II.
30  Commission (EC), ‘First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the 
Acquis Review’ (Report) COM (2005) 456 fi nal, 23 September 2005.
31  Eg Commissioner M Kyprianou’s speech ‘European Contract Law: Better Lawmaking to 
the Common Frame of Reference’ at the UK Presidency Conference in London 26 September 
2005, <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kyprianou/speeches_en.htm> accessed 
30 May 2007.
32  Cf S James at the hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs on 
21 November 2006, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/2006_en.htm> accessed 
30 May 2007.
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Against this background, the fi rst issue to be highlighted is one 
which might explain many of the reservations concerning legislative ac-
tivism,33 namely, the limits to contract law harmonisation imposed by the 
European Constitution in its present form, in particular by the compe-
tence provisions.
III. Competences and their limitation
The 2004 Communication expressly mentions Articles 65, 95 and 
308 EC as possible competence provisions with respect to private law 
codifi cation.34 With regard to substantive contract law, however, only the 
latter two provisions could provide fruitful grounds. Article 65 EC obvi-
ously does not offer the possibility of serving as a basis for competence 
in harmonising substantive law.35 It grants the EC legislator the compe-
tence to adopt measures concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters 
with cross-border implications and, insofar as is necessary, in order to 
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. Nevertheless, these 
provisions of Article 65 EC relate to harmonising confl ict rules and civil 
procedure. Moreover, this article is found under Title IV of the EC Treaty, 
ie among policies relating to the free movement of persons (‘Visas, asy-
lum and other policies related to free movement of persons’). The focus 
on harmonising procedural rules and the limitation to the free movement 
of persons thus make it hard to interpret the provisions of this article as 
grounds for harmonising substantive law related to the sale of goods.36
On second glance, Article 308 EC is also unlikely to serve as the basis 
for a comprehensive harmonisation of contract law. First of all, scholars 
have rightly argued that legislative action based on Article 308 EC would 
lack democratic legitimacy, since the current legislative procedure fore-
sees neither the participation of the European Parliament nor substan-
tial involvement by national parliaments.37 Moreover, its provisions could 
only serve as the legal basis for a Community measure where no other 
provisions of the Treaty would grant Community institutions the power 
necessary to adopt it. In this respect, the relevance of Article 308 EC has 
33  Even the 2004 Communication (n 3) refers to a lack of response to the competence ques-
tion: ‘[V]ery few contributors expressed their view on that issue.’ (Annex II, point 6). 
34  See the 2004 Communication (n 3) 21.
35  Some scholars do, however, believe that Art 65 EC, although not a legal basis for com-
prehensive legislative action, could nevertheless serve as a basis for harmonising substan-
tive law on a small scale. For references, see eg M Ludwigs, ‘Harmonisierung des Schuld-
vertragsrechts in Europa - Zur Reichweite der gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Zuständigkeit für 
eine Europäisierung des Privatrechts’ (2006) Europarecht 370, 381.
36  Ludwigs (n 35); Lurger (n 9) 112-114. 
37  Cf S Leible, ‘Die Mitteilung der Kommission zum Europäischen Vertragsrecht - Start-
schuss für ein Europäisches Vertragsgesetzbuch?’ (2001) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und 
Steuerrecht 471, 479; Ludwigs (n 35) 394-395.
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diminished since the Single European Act of 1986 introduced Article 95 
EC as a special competence provision aimed at market integration. With 
regard to the contract law project, recourse to Article 308 EC could only 
be considered if a measure were to aim at creating a new kind of legal 
system separate from national systems, and if it could not be regarded 
as simply aiming to approximate the laws of Member States in terms of 
Article 95 EC.38 Given that a comprehensive codifi cation of contract law 
has been removed from the agenda, and that the idea of approximating 
laws prevails in debates on European contract law, Article 95 EC pro-
vides a competence provision worth examining.
The internal market mandate: open-ended or restricted competence 
in pursuit of market integration? 
The introduction of Article 95 EC into the Treaty (formerly Article 
100a EEC) was the result of efforts to revive the internal market project 
in the 1980s. It gives the EC legislator the power to adopt measures for 
approximating laws whose object is the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market, based simply on a qualifi ed majority decision in the 
Council. The competence provision additionally features a special charac-
teristic providing for a strong role by the Community legislator in market 
integration. It is not sector-specifi c, but rather provides broad grounds 
for action in pursuit of the Community’s objective of establishing ‘an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty’.39 This also makes the provision specifi c with respect to its com-
petence-delimiting principles, particularly those relating to the limited 
attribution of powers and subsidiarity. Many commentators raised the 
question of how to make the competence delimiting principles work in 
practice.40 In this respect, no help came from the ECJ, which seemed re-
luctant to express its position regarding the limits of the internal market 
mandate. It took more than a decade following the introduction of Article 
95 EC before the Court intervened for the fi rst time. 
In its famous Tobacco Advertising judgment in 2000, the ECJ for 
the fi rst time struck down a directive as lacking a legal basis. The Court 
annulled a directive that contained a total ban on tobacco advertising.41 
38  For example, the creation of a new form of cooperative society permitted recourse to 
Art 308 EC. See Case 436/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-3733.
39  Article 14(2) EC.
40  For an excellent account of the issue, also with respect to the solutions in the Treaty on a 
Constitution for Europe, see S Weatherill, ‘Better Competence Monitoring’ (2005) EL Rev 23.
41  Directive(EC) 98/43 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approxima-
tion of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to 
the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products [1998] OJ L213/9.
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Besides dealing with the tricky question of whether the directive aimed at 
market harmonisation or public health, one of the Court’s most impor-
tant fi ndings was that Article 95 EC does not confer a general competence 
on the Community to regulate the internal market, and that a provision 
must be interpreted in light of the principle of conferral in Article 5 EC: 
To construe that article [Article 95 EC] as meaning that it vests in 
the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal 
market would not only be contrary to the express wording of the pro-
visions cited above but would also be incompatible with the principle 
embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 EC) that the 
powers of the Community are limited to those specifi cally conferred 
on it.42
 However, even though the ECJ’s decision made it clear that there 
are judicially policed limits to the Treaty’s functionally broad competenc-
es, the limits of Article 95 EC have not been redefi ned since the Tobacco 
Advertising ruling. Nor did the recent ruling on the follow-up tobacco ad-
vertising directive provide any new insights.43 Nevertheless, the Tobacco 
Advertising cases reveal much concerning the crux of the requirements 
which must be met before adopting measures pursuant to Article 95 EC. 
Naturally, such measures must, fi rst of all, genuinely aim to improve 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.44 
Secondly, they have to aim at eliminating current obstacles to trade and 
preventing their future emergence through the diverse development of 
national laws or, alternatively, preventing an appreciable risk of distor-
tion of competition.45
Contract law: an obstacle to trade?
But what does this mean in terms of divergent national contract 
laws? Do differences in contract laws create obstacles to trade? It has at 
least been made clear that obstacles to trade resulting from the varying 
development of national laws cannot be assumed simply by identifying 
disparities among national legal systems:
42  Case 376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council [1999] 
ECR I-8419 para 83. The Court again refers explicitly to the ‘principle, that the powers of 
the Community are those specifi cally conferred on it’ when arguing for case-by-case verifi -
cation of an appreciable distortion of competition; see paras 107/108.
43  Case 380/03 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council [2006] 
ECR I-11573.
44  Case 376/98 (n 42) para 84.
45  Cf Case 376/98 (n 42) paras 85/86 and 106/107.
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While a mere fi nding of disparities between national rules is not suf-
fi cient to justify having recourse to Article 95 EC, it is otherwise 
where there are differences between the laws, regulations or admin-
istrative provisions of the Member States which are such as to ob-
struct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the 
functioning of the internal market.46 (emphasis added)
However, what does the Court tell us about obstacles to trade here? 
One way of reading these lines would be to restrict recourse to Article 95 EC 
to situations where measures run contrary to Article 28 EC and, as such, 
‘obstruct the fundamental freedoms’. In this respect, it is far from clear 
whether the provisions of national contract law could be subsumed under 
the requirements of Article 28 EC, and thus constitute obstacles to trade 
at all. The answer would have to be negative if contract law provisions were 
characterised as selling arrangements as per Keck. In Keck and Mithouard 
the ECJ decided that only rules relating to product requirements (shape, 
size, colour, etc) could be illegal, while those concerning selling arrange-
ments (opening hours, staff training requirements, etc) could not be. Many 
scholars have thus tried to classify contract law rules or divide them into 
groups according to this differentiation.47 In this regard, some have argued 
for a classifi cation of contract law provisions as selling arrangements. After 
all, contract law regimes do not provide rules concerning the consistency 
or packaging of products, and so can always be classifi ed as selling ar-
rangements.48 Therefore, since contract law provisions can be seen as sell-
ing arrangements, and thus not contrary to Article 28 EC, the assumption 
of obstacles to trade as per Article 95 EC seems impossible. 
Yet reading such a restriction into the Court’s words seems un-
convincing. The formulation ‘it is otherwise where’ does not necessarily 
exclude the assumption of ‘obstacles to trade’ in other constellations. 
Moreover, the supposition that Article 28 EC would limit Article 95 EC is 
likewise not very convincing. On the contrary: is there not a need for posi-
tive harmonisation measures, or at least for discussion of such meas-
ures, when Article 28 EC fails to ensure the free movement of goods, be 
it due to a justifi cation of national measures pursuant to Article 30 EC, 
other ‘mandatory requirements’, or because ‘selling arrangements’ are 
involved?49 Negative and positive harmonisation motives should not be 
artifi cially linked in this way. Also, Keck should be viewed more as a judg-
46  Case 380/03 (n 43) para 37; as for the old Directive, cf Case 376/98 (n 42) paras 84, 
95.
47  For an overview of approaches, see O Langer, ‘Das Kaufrecht auf dem Prüfstand der 
Warenverkehrsfreiheit des EG-Vertrages’ (2001) RabelsZ 222.
48  In this regard, see eg Ludwigs (n 35).
49  Similarly, Ludwigs (n 35) 382.
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ment about Article 28 EC, and not about the internal market competence 
provision.50 However, this is not the place for extensive discussion of this 
issue. The point is only to show that contract law provisions might not be 
subsumed under ‘obstacles to trade’ in the sense of Article 95 EC. It is, 
therefore, interesting to examine which requirements would have to be 
fulfi lled in order to assume ‘distortions of competition’, the second pillar 
of the internal market mandate. 
‘Appreciable’ distortion of competition - empirical studies as a last 
resort?
In this respect, reference to Article 95 EC would also be possible if 
divergent laws were to incontestably represent an appreciable risk of dis-
tortion of competition.51 It is here, again, that the Court fails to provide 
more concrete tools for scrutinising Community measures: which distor-
tion is ‘appreciable’, and which is not? It is not surprising, therefore, that 
both the Community measures based on Article 95 EC and the Court’s 
rulings have met with strong criticism.52 Concerning non-mandatory 
rules, for example, one could generally argue against the assumption of 
an ‘appreciable’ distortion of competition, since the parties to a contract 
have an infl uence on its formation.53 Accordingly, only mandatory con-
tract law rules could be subject to harmonisation, and thus consumer 
protection rules in particular.54 However, even if one were to focus only 
on mandatory contract law, no feasible criteria would emerge in the face 
of different national legal solutions, values and cultures.
Empirical studies seem to have a considerable importance in this 
respect. Hitherto the Commission has also relied on surveys conducted 
with the relevant parties, eg consumers and business, to justify its ac-
tions. In its argumentation, the Commission often draws on Eurobarom-
eter surveys, for example. However, this approach can also be criticised 
in many respects. One private project which offered exemplary critical in-
sight was that conducted on behalf of a major English law fi rm, with Vo-
genauer and Weatherill acting as academic advisors.55 This law fi rm com-
50  Similarly, Lurger (n 9) 106.
51  Cf Case 376/98 (n 42) para 106.
52  As for the 2006 tobacco advertising ruling, see eg M Rauber, ‘Das Tabakwerbeverbotsur-
teil des EuGH’ (2007) Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 151.
53  In this vein, see the obiter in Case 339/89 Alsthom Atlantique v Sulzer [1991] ECR I-107 
para 15. For more comprehensive accounts of this issue, see eg Langer (n 47) or Ludwigs 
(n 35).
54  Cf Article 5 of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations.
55  See their comments in S Vogenauer, S Weatherill, ‘The European Community’s compe-
tence for a comprehensive harmonisation of contract law - an empirical analysis’ (2005) EL 
Rev 821.
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missioned a survey amongst 175 fi rms in eight Member States, seeking 
to include a mix of both larger and smaller economies and old and new 
Member States. The point of departure seemed to be a certain scepticism 
among the members of the law fi rm as to whether users of contract law, 
and businesses more specifi cally, really do fi nd different legal systems to 
be an obstacle to trade which distorts competition.56 
The project’s fi ndings give good reason for scepticism about survey 
results. It is important to mention here that the project rightly under-
scored the importance of empirical research and, in this respect, even 
supported some of the Commission’s fi ndings in a more comprehensive 
European survey from 2002. As such, the law fi rm’s survey also revealed 
that businesses view the concept of harmonised contract law favourably, 
to a large degree.57 However, it also revealed the shortcoming of surveys 
and the diffi culties encountered in drafting questions. For example, ques-
tions concerning mandatory rules for protecting consumers and other 
weaker parties or the possible negative consequences of introducing a 
European contract law were not included, so as to enable the drafting of 
a manageable questionnaire.58 As for the law fi rm’s project, there are no 
better concluding words than the authors’ own:
Let us fi nally acknowledge that even if businesses unanimously 
wished to have a uniform contract law, this would not entail that it 
has to be given to them. If asked, they probably would also want to 
have zero taxes and the lowest possible standards of consumer pro-
tection. There may be valid reasons, in the interests of consumers 
and society as a whole (in this case: societies as a whole), not to go 
ahead with further harmonisation.59
In a European Union of 27 or (soon) even more members, it will 
never be possible to draft an all-embracing questionnaire, or involve a 
big enough number of representatives from all of the Member States and 
sub-national actors so as to reach a fully comprehensive and satisfac-
tory survey. Moreover, the results of such surveys will always be open to 
interpretation. Some examples of such interpretation will be given when 
discussing the CFR below. 
In any case, it must be concluded that Article 95 EC does not pro-
vide an unlimited competence to adopt a comprehensive European con-
tract law. While its scope has been far from clear hitherto, the constraints 
introduced by the ECJ and reasons of democratic legitimacy demand 
56  Ibid, references on p 830. 
57  Ibid 835.
58  Ibid 829-830.
59  Ibid 837.
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that extensive (mis)use of the internal market provision in the pursuit of 
contract law harmonisation must be considered carefully. In particular, 
the vague defi nition of ‘obstacles to trade’ and ‘distortions of competi-
tion’ means that the reasoning behind measures at the European level 
remains within the discretion of the EC legislator. The lack of more con-
crete criteria calls for increased transparency on the part of the European 
legislator when proposing and drafting legislation.
Who is to decide? - the everlasting debate on subsidiarity
It was precisely such Community empowerments as Article 95 EC 
which led to growing resistance among Member States, after the Commu-
nity’s sphere of activity was expanded through the Single European Act.60 
As a result, the current Article 5 EC was introduced into the Maastricht 
Treaty as a safeguard against extensive supranational (mis)use of compe-
tences. With the inclusion of the guiding principles in the Treaty, ‘confer-
ral’ was to underscore the Member States’ role as the Herren der Verträge, 
while ‘subsidiarity’ was to guarantee them a strong say as to the level of 
decision-making, at least as far as the Member States themselves and 
sub-national actors were concerned.61 As depicted above, however, the 
non-sector-specifi c Article 95 EC seems to speak a language of its own. 
Likewise, the subsidiarity principle as embodied in today’s Article 5(2) EC 
provides more a political tool than a legal safeguard against the extensive 
exercise of competence. 
The principle of subsidiarity was introduced into the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, to counter-balance an alleged centralisation of powers 
and thus delimit the Community’s competences. It has certainly cap-
tured the attention of an increasing number of legal scholars and policy-
makers since then.62 However, while now unquestionably playing a key 
role in the legislative process, the idea of creating an ex post judicial 
60  In addition, Art 95 EC suddenly confronted Member States with the qualifi ed majority 
voting system.
61  For deeper refl ection on the competence delimitation debate and additional references, 
see J-P Trnka, ‘Subsidiarity: Competence Control or Political Masquerade?’ in N Neuwahl 
and S Haack (eds), Unresolved Issues of the Constitution for Europe - Rethinking the Crisis 
(Les Éditions Thémis, Montreal 2007) 239.
62  In this context, the European Subsidiarity Conference ‘Europe begins at home’, held in 
Austria on 18/19 April 2006, and the cooperative efforts between European institutions 
and national parliaments within the framework of the Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees (COSAC) may be mentioned. Recent scholarly publications include S Albin, ‘Das 
Subsidiaritätsprinzip in der EU - Anspruch und Rechtswirklichkeit’ (2006) Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht 629; I Cooper, ‘The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments 
and the Logic of Arguing in the EU’ (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies 281; and C 
Ritzer, M Ruttloff and K Linhart, ‘How to sharpen a Dull Sword - The Principle of Subsidi-
arity and its Control’ (September 2006) German Law Journal <http://www.germanlawjour-
nal.com> accessed 30 May 2007.
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safeguard has failed so far.63 When the ECJ was asked to decide on the 
requirements and scope of the subsidiarity principle, it became obvious 
that the Court would be required to make demanding assessments of an 
essentially political nature, ie as to whether Member States’ measures 
would be suffi cient, or if Community action would be preferable. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the ECJ has not referred to the subsidiarity 
principle very frequently, and has avoided an elaboration of the princi-
ple’s material content. So far the ECJ has never annulled a measure for 
infringement of the subsidiarity principle. 
With respect to the European contract law project, however, it is not 
even necessary to delve deeper into the debate on this principle. Nor is 
it necessary to recall discussions as to whether Article 95 EC represents 
an exclusive competence of the Community and, therefore, cannot be af-
fected by the subsidiarity principle. The idea of approximation as such 
already limits the effectiveness of the principle, since it would, in fact, be 
diffi cult for a single Member State to prove that it could approximate laws 
better than the Community legislator: ‘As the scope of that protection 
has immediate effects on trade, and, accordingly, on intra-Community 
trade, it is clear that, given the scale and effects of the proposed action, 
the objective in question could be better achieved by the Community’.64 
As such, subsidiarity does not provide fertile ground for delimiting the 
internal market mandate.
We shall now return to the European contract law project and its 
search for the best solutions for the entire European Union and, in this 
respect, to the CFR, the proclaimed lighthouse in the vast sea of Euro-
pean contract law.
IV. The Common Frame of Reference and the search for ‘best 
solutions’
CFR - three letters that might indicate the project’s outcome: Confu-
sion, Fragmentation and Restraint? Be that as it may, a tight time sched-
ule has been set for the CFR project, and many actors have joined the 
game. A fi rst draft is expected to be available already at the end of 2007. 
In the second half of 2008 a White Paper, including the fi nal draft CFR, 
should be published for further consultation with the general public be-
fore the fi nal CFR is adopted by the end of 2009, ie the end of the Barosso 
Commission.65 
The overall project is being led by the Commission’s Directorate-Gen-
eral for Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO), but elaboration of 
63  For a more comprehensive account of the subsidiarity principle, see Trnka (n 61).
64  Case 377/98 The Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079 para 32. 
65  Cf C von Bar and H Schulte-Nölke (n 26).
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the fi rst draft of the CFR was commissioned from the academic CoPECL 
network, which is to interact with two other groups in its efforts.66 On 
the one hand, there is a network of stakeholders, the ‘CFR-net’, bring-
ing together stakeholder experts from business, consumer organisations 
and the legal profession, so as to ensure active participation by practi-
tioners; on the other, a group of government experts from the Member 
States, who should provide input of national viewpoints into the project. 
The choice and involvement of these many actors have, of course, led to 
continual criticism of the CFR project and its efforts. For example, the 
initial role of DG SANCO was rightly questioned, since the contract law 
project has, to all intents and purposes, always been an internal market 
project affecting many areas besides consumer protection. To address 
this problem, an inter-service group within the Commission has since 
been established, whose aim is to ensure that the interests of other Com-
mission services are also taken into account.67 Also, many of the CoPECL 
network’s other members do not feel suffi ciently involved in the drafting 
process.68 Despite these organisational problems, however, much work 
has already been done, and it is interesting to examine the fi rst foreshad-
owed outcomes. 
One is tempted to ask what exactly is this frame of reference sup-
posed to be? Is it one of those massive frames with rich ornamentation, 
which shapes the identity of the entire composition? Or is it one of those 
thin, rudimentary ones, leaving all the space for a famous European work 
of modern art that aims to unite all the elements in their diversity? In 
fact, answering these questions should be easy - all the more so since 
the Commission outlined the CFR’s possible function and structure in 
its 2004 Communication.69 In brief, the original aim was to improve the 
quality and coherence of both the existing acquis and future legal in-
struments in the area of contract law, while at the same time serving to 
simplify the acquis and provide clear defi nitions of legal terms and fun-
damental principles, as well as coherent model rules for contract law.70 
The Communication even defi ned individual issues, dividing them into 
chapters, sections, numbers and letters. Yet the fi nal outcome of the CFR 
project is still unknown. It is possible, therefore, only to sum up what 
factors might affect its ultimate output.
66  For a deeper account of the current range of actors, see Röttinger (n 24) 817-822.
67  Ibid 817.
68  Cf Beale (n 1); for a critical account from a government expert, see T Astola, ‘Katsauksia 
ja pienempiä kirjoituksia’ (2007) Lakimies 573.
69  2004 Communication (n 3) Annex I.
70  Cf 2004 Communication (n 3).
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What the CFR will not be, and what it might be
Confronted with the letters ‘CFR’, an American observer might think 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, ie a codifi cation of permanent, gen-
eral rules divided into 50 titles representing the broad areas subject to 
federal regulation. In Europe, however, CFR stands for Common Frame 
of Reference and, indeed, a European counterpart to the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations could never exist - certainly not a ‘federal’ instrument, 
and most likely not a ‘code’ or ‘regulations’, either. Why is that? Above 
all, the European Union is not a federation. Europe has decided for a 
‘constitutional Sonderweg’.71 Even though it comprises some ‘federal’ ar-
rangements in its architecture, it is not a full-fl edged federation. Its insti-
tutional arrangement, for example, is rather of a confederal nature, with 
the Council, and thus the Member States’ representatives, having the 
last word in decision-making. Above all, a federal state would presuppose 
the existence of a European constitutional demos.72 However, the Euro-
pean model is based on the distinct peoples of its components. In Com-
missioner Grybauskaite’s words: ‘The EU is not a federation, it does not 
have a federal government and our integration is going differently’.73
Secondly, there is no striving for a European code. Already in its 
2004 Communication, the Commission explicitly renounced the idea 
of an all-embracing code: ‘It is important to explain that it is [not] the 
Commission’s intention to propose a “European civil code” which would 
harmonise contract laws of Member States’.74 And the Council’s conclu-
sions to date have welcomed ‘the Commission’s repeated reassurance 
that it does not intend to propose a “European Civil Code” which would 
harmonise contract laws of Member States, and that Member States’ 
differing legal traditions will be fully taken into account’.75 Thirdly, the 
(short-term) outcome will probably not be a regulation. A regulation in 
terms of Article 249 of the EC Treaty is an EU decision that directly binds 
all Member States and citizens all over the EU. It is directly applicable, 
which means that it need not be transposed into national law, but rather 
confers rights or imposes duties on Community citizens in the same way 
as national law. Of course, one could conceive of a contract law codifi ca-
71  JHH Weiler, ‘In defence of the status quo: Europe’s constitutional Sonderweg’ in JHH 
Weiler and M Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism beyond the State (CUP, Cambridge 
2003) 7.
72  Cf P Kirchhof, ‘Europa auf dem Weg zu einer Verfassung?’ in K Beckmann, J Dieringer 
and U Hufeld (eds) Eine Verfassung für Europa (2nd edn Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2005) 359, 
or Weiler (n 71).
73  Commissioner Grybauskaite in an interview with the EU Observer on 7 March 2007, 
concerning the harmonisation of taxes in Europe.
74  2004 Communication (n 3) para 2.3.
75  Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council, 28/29 November 2005, no 10.
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tion that would be adopted in the form of a regulation. This view was also 
confi rmed by many commentators in their response to the Commission’s 
Communications.76 However, even in recognising these commentators’ 
preference for an ‘opt-in’ instrument taking the form of a regulation, the 
Commission ‘considers at this stage that the CFR would be a non-binding 
instrument’.77 A CFR in the form of an EU regulation seems, therefore, 
rather unrealistic.
However, after this ‘negative selection’ of what the CFR will not be, 
it is interesting to consider what the CFR could or will be, particularly 
since adoption of the fi nal CFR is already foreseen for 2009.78 Recent 
events have provided a picture of how the CFR project might culminate. 
In the exact words of the Commission, the CFR will be ‘a tool box for the 
Commission when preparing proposals, both for the existing acquis and 
for new instruments’.79 While the author’s dictionary of legal terminology 
does not feature ‘tool box’, the Oxford English Dictionary has fortunately 
helped him out. According to the latter, ‘tool box’ may be defi ned as a 
‘reservoir of instruments with which some operation is performed’, or 
as a ‘means of effecting something’. However, even when applying these 
defi nitions, there are at least two possible interpretations. The more nar-
row one would opt for an instrument with which an operation, or - in the 
European context - a legislative activity, is performed. The other would 
favour a reservoir of ideas as a means of effecting something, be it bind-
ing codes or model laws of whatever kind and scope. And this paradox 
is refl ected in the proposals which have been arriving one after the other 
lately. Whole books could be fi lled just with the outlines of all these ideas. 
However, it is the CoPECL network which has been entrusted with elabo-
rating the fi rst draft of the CFR, and thus will have the fi rst say; and its 
approach seems to differ from the low-profi le, ‘no-code’ attitude of the 
Commission.
The academic working groups have focused on a broader under-
standing of the CFR, an option given to them by the Sixth Framework 
Programme, which supports independent research and thus allows re-
sults independent of the Commission’s directive.80 The outcome of the 
76  2004 Communication (n 3): ‘As we have seen above, a great majority of respondents 
expressed its preference for an “opt in” instrument. If this approach is followed, there is 
signifi cant support for a regulation’ (point 3).
77  2004 Communication (n 3) para 2.1.3.
78  See Beale (n 1) for a summary of the work in progress.
79  2004 Communication (n 3) Annex I (Possible structure of the CFR).
80  The Sixth Framework Programme is the European Community Framework Programme 
for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration. It is a collection of EU-level 
actions for funding and promoting research. For further information, see <http://ec.europa.
eu/research/fp6> accessed 20 March 2007.
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academics’ efforts will most probably resemble an updated version of the 
Principles of European Contract Law.81 Christian von Bar recently out-
lined this picture at a hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee 
on Legal Affairs on 21 November 2006: ‘In less than a year we will present 
to the constitutional institutions of the EU and the public a text which 
will be in the form […] of a commentated and annotated model law’.82 To 
be politically correct, he added: ‘[N]aturally, it will not be a European Civil 
Code. This is solely a stylistic device.’83
However, it is certainly too early to evaluate the CFR efforts, as they 
remain above all a work in progress. Nor does this article intend to delve 
into details and speculation. Nevertheless, the new instrument will as-
sume a concrete form very soon, and the paradox of drafting a CFR code 
while making ‘no-code’ claims demands attention. In this respect, the 
Commission’s latest statements on the CFR project may reveal some of its 
intentions for the way ahead. In its First Annual Progress Report on Eu-
ropean Contract Law and Acquis Review from the end of 2005, the Com-
mission refl ected on the work undertaken to that date and outlined the 
main policy issues.84 Most recently, the Commission published a Green 
Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, concluding the diagnostic 
phase of its review of the consumer acquis and summing up the Commis-
sion’s initial fi ndings.85 This document’s title suggests that it only refers 
to the ‘parallel project’ of reviewing the acquis. The CFR is, however, sup-
posed to be a tool box for the review procedure. Thus it is interesting to 
examine what the ‘best solutions’ are meant to be, and what attitude and 
intentions the Commission reveals in its latest Green Paper.
The search for best solutions
The Commission has defi ned what the research network is to elabo-
rate for the Common Frame of Reference as ‘best solutions’.86 For this 
purpose, the 2004 Communication gives guidelines about where to look 
for them: ‘The research preparing the CFR will aim to identify best solu-
tions, taking into account national contract laws […], the EC acquis and 
81  O Lando and H Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law. Parts I and II Combined 
and Revised (Kluwer, The Hague 2000); O Lando, E. Clive, A Prüm and R Zimmermann (eds) 
Principles of European Contract Law. Part III (Kluwer, The Hague 2003).
82  Free translation; see n 4 above for the original wording.
83  Ibid.
84  First Annual Progress Report (n 30).
85  Commission (EC) ‘Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis’ (Green Paper) 
COM (2006) 744 fi nal, 8 February 2007. The Commission fi ndings are the result of a com-
parative analysis of eight consumer law directives in 25 Member States, conducted by a 
research team led by H Schulte-Nölke.
86  2004 Communication (n 3) point 3.1.3.
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relevant international instruments […]’.87 However, such a guideline does 
not help to defi ne what a ‘best solution’ is supposed to be. One could, of 
course, argue that there will always be some solution in one of the Mem-
ber States’ legal systems that ‘best’ serves the purpose at hand. However, 
does this mean that 26 of the 27 Member States, not to mention inter-
national conventions, opt for ‘bad solutions’? Hardly likely. Rather, it is a 
question of a whole ‘package of solutions’ representing the standard in the 
given domestic sphere, and depending on different cultures, values and 
other motives. So, how to defi ne the ‘best solution’ among all these good 
choices? And who decides for whom the best solution is really ‘best’?
Even before the start of the European contract law project, one of the 
central issues in academic discussion of the harmonisation of European 
contract law was whether or not it should be accomplished via legislative 
activity.88 Two schools of thought have generally dominated the debate. 
The positivist school favours the formal unifi cation of European contract 
law ‘from above’, while others doubt whether the time has come for a Eu-
rope-wide codifi cation of contract law. This latter school seeks to avoid 
the problems of static codifi cation, advocating the development of a com-
mon private law ‘from below’ through an informal, ‘creeping’ process.89 
Commentators have found various other names for these two options, be 
they ex ante versus ex post harmonisation, or ‘top down’ versus ‘bottom 
up’. The reasons for following one or the other line are of a diverse ideo-
logical or pragmatic nature. As for the European way, a combination of 
both approaches - top down and bottom up - is today’s reality. Some kind 
of middle way will have to be found in the future as well, in order to en-
sure diversity while promoting common goals. The question, then, is how 
much the European legislator should interfere in the national sphere?
When talking about harmonisation in terms of interference in the 
national sphere, however, the opening of national legal orders and the 
negative harmonisation approach should not go unmentioned. Back in 
1985, the Commission’s White Paper on completion of the internal mar-
ket proposed a new approach to European regulation, including as its 
key elements the restriction of legislative harmonisation and the principle 
of ‘mutual recognition’ of rules and standards among the Member States, 
meaning that ‘goods lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Mem-
ber State must be allowed free entry into other Member States’.90 This 
87  Ibid.
88  See eg KP Berger, ‘Harmonisation of European Contract Law, The Infl uence of Compara-
tive Law’ (2001) ICLQ 877.
89  For a representative opinion survey, see An Academic Green Paper on European Contract 
Law (n 14).
90  Cf Commission (EC) ‘Completing the Internal Market’ (White Paper) COM (85) 310 fi nal, 
14 June 1985, 22.
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new approach underlined a strategy that was catalysed by the famous 
Cassis de Dijon decision, in which the ECJ established the principle of 
mutual recognition. The Court overturned a German prohibition on the 
sale of alcoholic drinks which, according to German rules, should have 
had a higher percentage of alcohol. The ECJ’s ruling in 1979 was that 
‘there is […] no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully 
produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages 
should not be introduced into any other Member State’.91 The immediate 
reason for relying on the negative integration approach was certainly the 
Commission’s acknowledgement that the goal of completing the internal 
market by 1993 could not be achieved by relying exclusively on extension 
of the acquis, and that the volume of work still ahead had to be reduced. 
However, the ‘new approach’ has also forced national legislators to fol-
low the diverse approaches to legal issues all over Europe. As such, the 
EC legislator’s self-restriction, the four market freedoms, and negative 
integration have prepared the ground for regulatory competition among 
Member States’ legal solutions in a non-discriminatory European sphere. 
The CFR could provide another catalyst to the regulatory competition 
scheme within Europe (and beyond). 
The Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis: limits to 
internal market thinking?
Having supported the regulatory competition idea, however, it is 
important to examine divergent approaches concerning how minimum 
standards are and will be protected, so as to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’. 
Most of the existing European consumer rules are based on the principle 
of ‘minimum harmonisation’. This approach recognises the right of Mem-
ber States to add stricter rules on top of European rules establishing a 
common platform for all Member States within the European Community, 
thus leaving room for regulatory competition even in harmonised areas 
of law while setting common (high) standards. However, in recent years 
the Commission has clearly signalled its attempt to redirect Community 
consumer policy towards a ‘full’ or maximum harmonisation approach.92 
The Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP) directive was a fi rst step in this 
direction,93 and the Commission was even more explicit in its Commu-
91  Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649.
92  For a deeper analysis, see eg G Howells, ‘The Rise of European Consumer Law - Whither 
National Consumer Law?’ (2006) Sydney Law Review 63; T Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the 
“Confi dent Consumer” as a Justifi cation for EC Consumer Law’ (2004) Journal of Con-
sumer Policy 317.
93  For a deeper analysis, see H-W Micklitz, ‘Minimum/Maximum Harmonisation and the 
Internal Market Clause’ in G Howells, H-W Micklitz and T Wilhelmsson (eds) European Fair 
Trading Law (Ashgate, Aldershot 2006) 83.
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nication on EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013: ‘If legislative pro-
posals are identifi ed as the appropriate response, targeted full harmo-
nisation of consumer protection rules at an appropriately high level will 
tend to be the Commission’s approach’.94 This change in thinking is also 
apparent from the Commission’s recent Green Paper on the Review of 
the Consumer Acquis. Although only a ‘questionnaire’, the Green Paper’s 
argumentation opts primarily for a horizontal solution to future activity 
by the European legislator, and thus also for ‘full harmonisation’, point-
ing to certain ‘issues’ such as fragmentation and lack of confi dence. It is 
obvious, therefore, that the Commission’s focus on maximalist interven-
tion has not changed.
The three main issues which the Green Paper identifi es are new 
market developments, fragmentation of rules, and lack of confi dence.95 
Against the background of the ongoing debate about minimum versus 
maximum harmonisation, it is thus interesting to examine whether these 
issues represent viable arguments in favour of the Commission’s way of 
thinking. Do market developments, the assumed fragmentation of rules, 
and lack of confi dence really necessitate EC activity in the proposed man-
ner?
In this respect, new market developments certainly give reason for 
constant attention by the EC legislator. Most directives were adopted in 
the 1980s or 1990s, and so require some alteration to meet the demands 
of today’s rapidly evolving markets and new technological inventions. 
Hence, new market developments are a well-founded reason for review-
ing the acquis. However, it is what is not stated in the Green Paper that 
reveals the market ideology followed by the Commission. It would have 
been more appropriate to cite comments on ‘market developments’ in 
terms of market growth via Community enlargement, for instance. Most 
of the directives were bargained among nine, ten, twelve or fi fteen Mem-
ber States, not 27 of them. Some further observations about the infl u-
ence of the ‘newcomers’ would not have been out of place. Nevertheless, 
it remains a serious concern that a rapidly evolving market environment 
entails a regular quality review for existing legislation. 
The second defi ned issue, fragmentation of rules, likewise gives good 
reason to review the acquis. The Green Paper distinguishes between two 
types of fragmentation: on the one hand, fragmentation caused by incon-
sistencies between directives; on the other, that caused by the minimum 
harmonisation approach, which allows Member States to adopt more 
stringent rules in their national laws. Nobody will deny the necessity of 
94  Commission (EC) ‘EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013’ (Communication) COM 
(2007) 99 fi nal, 13 March 2007, 7.
95  Cf Green Paper (n 85).
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reviewing the acquis so as to detect inconsistencies and other kinds of 
loopholes. However, while the second type of ‘fragmentation’ is presented 
virtually as a threat to the Community, minimum harmonisation only 
refers to the idea that the Community, in line with the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, would set minimum standards and leave room for national devia-
tions in specifi c matters. In fact, most directives are quite strict in terms 
of their demands, and ‘fragmentation’ is relatively easy to identify and, 
thus, to deal with.96
Even less convincing is the third identifi ed issue, the ‘lack of con-
fi dence’ argument. Certainly, retailers have to reckon with some extra 
costs for cross-border sales. But are these really so diffi cult to determine 
that consumers will have to accept maximalist intervention by the Com-
munity, not allowing any room for possible higher protection in defi ned 
areas? The Eurobarometer results which the Commission uses to cement 
its argumentation are, at the least, unconvincing. For instance, the sur-
vey shows that ‘as many as 45% of the consumers feel less confi dent in 
making purchases on the Internet from businesses located abroad’, as 
further demonstrated by the fact that ‘44% of those who had Internet ac-
cess at home made a domestic e-commerce purchase whereas only 12% 
made across-border e-commerce purchase’.97 However, is it not simply 
higher shipping costs, language barriers, and some anxiety about new 
technologies which lead to this phenomenon? It seems more appropriate 
to argue that the European consumer has profi ted highly from the Com-
munity’s past harmonisation efforts, despite the minimum harmonisa-
tion approach. Nearly every consumer is aware, for example, of the mini-
mum 2-year warranty scheme and certain other remedies available, even 
though he or she may not be aware of their European origin. But how 
many consumers really consider inconsistencies or slight divergences in 
cooling-off periods, for example? 
To conclude, it seems inappropriate to head for a general maximum 
harmonisation scheme. It is too short-sighted to write minimum harmo-
nisation off as minimalist patchwork, even though many older directives 
were not well drafted. Rather, it would be better to fi nd improved qual-
ity management mechanisms for the legislative procedure. Here the CFR 
could help, offering clear defi nitions and principles that could prevent fur-
ther fragmentation. Nevertheless, even when following a minimum harmo-
nisation scheme, many issues will have to be formulated in a maximalist 
way so as to ensure the consistency of the acquis. But this does not mean 
that higher protection possibilities should be ruled out in any event. 
96  On the question of the adoption or maintenance of more stringent national rules, see P 
Roth, ‘Minimum harmonisation for the completion of the internal market? The example of 
consumer sales law’ (2003) CML Rev 1107.
97  Green Paper (n 85) 7.
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V. Some fi nal remarks
The European contract law project is said to be part of the Lisbon 
Strategy.98 At the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the EU set 
itself the goal of making its economy the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world. At this point, however, the en-
tire Lisbon Agenda appears to be heading towards outright failure of its 
original target date of 2010 (or even later), recalling the infamous 1992 
deadline for completing the internal market. In this vein, the Commission 
has already changed its rhetoric: ‘The single market is a means; it is not 
an end’, and as such ‘it will never be “fi nalised” or “complete”’.99 Does that 
not give cause to rethink the underlying values and refocus on European 
values, also with respect to contract laws? Europe has always been small 
in size, yet its richness stems from its fragmentation and diversity. Could 
this strength in difference not also boost Europe’s innovativeness in the 
legal sphere? 
Differences between national legal systems are the essential pre-
condition for a learning process within the Community. In this regard, 
the negative harmonisation approach is an essential ingredient of the 
Community system’s functioning. In addition, a sector-specifi c minimum 
harmonisation of laws and a process of recurrent review guarantee ever 
closer common standards in Europe. Minimum harmonisation does not 
mean that no room would remain for harmonisation to set welfare levels 
and protect standards that the Community agrees upon. The ‘race to the 
bottom’ argument seems very weak when confronted with today’s achieve-
ments. Despite the minimum harmonisation approach, the Community 
has set minimum standards in all its areas of competence and, some 
would argue, even in certain areas beyond its competence (eg Tobacco 
Advertising). It is, of course, a reasonable concern that inconsistencies in 
the existing acquis be detected and loopholes leading to further fragmen-
tation be closed. And one possible role of the CFR in this respect would 
be to serve as a quality-control instrument for drafting European legisla-
tion. Yet it would be counterproductive to close the door to opportunities 
arising from regulatory competition. Going even one step beyond this, the 
diversifi cation of laws in a multispeed organisation would seem preferable 
to forcing a Community member to adopt lower standards than those it 
has chosen.
98  D Staudenmayer, for example, refers to the offi cial strategy of the German government, 
which includes the CFR in a list of focal points on the agenda for achieving the Lisbon 
goals, in ‘Weitere Schritte im Europäischen Vertragsrecht’ (2005) Europäische Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht 103.
99  Commission (EC), ‘A Single Market for Citizens - Interim Report to the 2007 Spring Eu-
ropean Council’ (Communication) COM (2007) 60 fi nal, 21 February 2007, 3, 10.
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Due to the lack of more concrete criteria with respect to the internal 
market mandate, steps must be taken to involve stakeholders in legis-
lative decision-making and increase its transparency. The conclusions 
from a public hearing on future single market policy in November 2006 
point to welcome changes in the Commission’s consultation procedures 
in general.100 In this respect, proposals concerning the way the Commis-
sion consults (for example, devising uniform consultation practices with-
in the Commission, providing more feedback on the results, and ensur-
ing better coordination among the Commission’s DGs) are important and 
necessary in order to guarantee greater transparency, and thus legiti-
macy.101 Another issue is the degree of objectivity on the part of European 
institutions in the consultation process. The example of empirical studies 
shows that the Eurobarometer reports can be used to justify legislative 
activity. Yet relying on surveys requires a healthy dose of self-criticism 
and self-restraint. Why provide the general public with a questionnaire 
whose questions are drafted in a way that already suggests the next step? 
And why refer to individual survey results (supporting the need for EC 
activity) when the complete results are not yet published? For example, 
the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis refers to a Flash 
Eurobarometer report on business attitudes which, however, was not ac-
cessible during the consultation period for the Green Paper.102
The European contract law project has given academia a chance to 
infl uence the Europeanisation of laws. However, it is questionable wheth-
er this opportunity to infl uence future developments has been used ap-
propriately. The wide ‘frame of reference’ idea would also create space for 
setting up a common European education agenda. To quote Christian 
von Bar once again: ‘What is on the agenda is the creation of a kind of 
model law with far-reaching consequences for a common education in 
law throughout Europe’.103 His words indicate precisely one of the real 
challenges we are facing today. Even with uniform laws, the lion’s share 
of cases before courts will remain unclear and diffi cult. What is needed 
in such cases is, rather, well-educated lawyers who will have the skills 
to function in an increasingly integrated European and global environ-
ment. Therefore, legal education and training should include alternatives 
100  For further information on future internal market policy, see <http://ec.europa.eu/in-
ternal_market/strategy/index_en.htm/> accessed 30 May 2007.
101  Cf Single Market News no 44, January 2007, 4-6.
102  Green Paper (n 85) fn 15: ‘Flash Eurobarometer 186 on business attitudes towards 
cross-border trade and consumer protection, conducted in October 2006. The survey will 
be published in its totality on the DG Health and Consumer Protection web page’. The fi xed 
period for replies to the Commission’s questions ended on 15 May 2007, but the survey was 
not available on the web page by that date.
103  C von Bar at the hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, 21 
November 2006.
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to traditional basic law courses, in order to help the legal profession ex-
plore emerging fi elds of law and be able to react to changes in their fi eld 
of expertise.104 Where, then, is the ‘Study Group on Curriculum Design 
and Teaching Methods’? 
It must be said that it is still too early to criticise the outcome of the 
European contract law project. Many excellent ideas have been present-
ed in the course of modernising and re-integrating the European legal 
sphere. And whatever the fi nal outcome will be, politicians will have ben-
efi ted from the project and, at the same time, given a boost to European 
academia. European institutions will not only receive results legitimated 
by ‘expert democracy’, but they will also have fi nally made academics 
aware of changes within their profession. One could speak of a right step 
towards an ‘ever closer union’ of academics within Europe. When the 
Americans sent their fi rst expedition to the Moon, Neil Armstrong’s words 
were broadcast all over the world: ‘That’s one small step for a man, one 
giant leap for mankind.’ And who cares if he was really standing on the 
Moon, or if the broadcast was being transmitted from a Hollywood studio. 
The real success were the innumerable inventions, patents and discover-
ies made on the way. 
104  In this regard, see W van Gerven, ‘Codifying European Private Law: Top Down and Bot-
tom Up’ in An Academic Green Paper (n 14) 405.
